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Book Review 
EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE 
COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL 
ACTIVISM. By Michael A. Rebel1 and Arthur R. Block. 
'Chicago, Illinois, The University of Chicago Press 1982. Pp. 
xv, 319. $27.50. 
Reviewed by James J. Fishman* 
"Thou shall not sit 
With statisticians nor commit 
A social science"' 
I. Educational Policymaking in the Courts 
For over twenty years the common wisdom has been that 
legal realism is dead.a Educational Policymaking and the 
Courts: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activisms by Michael 
A. ~ e b e l l  and Arthur R. Block makes rumors of legal realism's 
death exaggerated.' This is not the place to argue whether legal 
realism is a philosophy, a movement, a creed, or a schoolP At the 
very least it is a method of undertaking research, of using the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. AB., A.M., University 
of Pennsylvania; J.D., PhD., New York University. 
1. Auden, Under Which Lyre. in COUCTED SHORTER POEMS 225 (1966). 
2. See Gilmore, Legal Realism, Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961); 
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experi- 
ence, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979); Note, 'Round And 'Round The Bramble Bush: 
From Legal Realism to Critical Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669. 1676 (1982). 
3. M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL PO ICYMAKING AND THE COURTS: AN EMPIRI- 
CAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL CTIVISM (1982) [hereinafter cited as REBELL & BLOCK]. 
4. This is a paraphrase of Mark Twain's comment: "The report of my death was an 
exaggeration." J. BARTLEIT, FAMILUR QUOTATIONS 763a (14th ed. 1968) (quoting a cable- 
gram sent from London by Mark Twain to the Associated Press on June 2, 1897). 
5. See generally K .  LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 508-18 (1960) [herein- 
after cited as COMMON LAW]; Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism - Responding to 
Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1930-1931) [hereinafter cited as Some Realism]; see 
also Schlegel, supra note 2. 
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techniques of the social sciences to better understand the judi- 
cial proces~.~ Educational Policymaking and the Courts is a 
unique attempt to relate significant empirical data to arguments 
raised in the controversy over judicial activism by subjecting a 
broad survey of representative educational areas, two in depth 
judicial case studies, and two comparative legislative case stud- 
ies to a common theoretical framework. The authors analyze the 
role of courts in educational policymaking in an effort to deter- 
mine whether the judiciary has the capacity and authority 
within traditional constitutional doctrines of the separation of 
powers to resolve social policy issues through intervention into 
the policymaking process. 
The involvement of courts in educational matters has re- 
sulted in a cottage industry of law review articles, student notes, 
and comments. With but a very few exceptions, this scholarship 
has taken Auden's quip to heart. It has focused either on the 
analysis of the constitutional legal doctrines involved, reviews of 
the West Publishing Company's advance sheets, or in a few in- 
stances, in-depth atheoretical case studies of significant educa- 
tional litigation. There has been little research which systemati- 
cally investigates actual judicial practices and integrates relevant 
legal theory with such empirical findings. Rebell and Block have 
attempted to bridge that gap. To report that they are but par- 
tially successful is nonetheless a substantial accomplishment. 
11. The Theoretical Framework: The Judicial Activism 
Controversy 
In the first chapter Rebell and Block present an overview of 
the intellectual debate over judicial activism and the court's role 
in p~licymaking.~ 
While the judiciary has become involved in complex institu- 
tional reforms of other areas of modern life besides education: 
6. See Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. 
L. REV. 809, 821-34 (1935); Some Realism, supra note 5, at 1236-37, 1240-41, 1244-45, 
Note, supra note 2, at 1674-76. 
7. The discussion is conducted on a high intellectual level and is somewhat abstruse, 
except for those who are teachers or etudenta of constitutional law. 
8. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ale. N.D. 1976) (prison systems); 
Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 1972) (state mental health 
systems). 
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educational policy litigation has been a prime focus of the "judi- 
cial activism" controversy. According to Professor Abram 
Chayes, increasing involvement of the judiciary in institutional 
reform and policymaking has led to a new kind of law~uit .~ 
Whereas the traditional lawsuit is bipolar, involving a contest 
between two individuals or entities with diametrically opposed 
interests wherein the impact of the court's judgment is confined 
to the immediate parties, this new model of public law litigation 
is multipolar, involving numerous parties and points of view, 
with broad remedial decrees which are often negotiated by the 
parties. The court's decree often has important consequences for 
many outside the courtroom. In institutional reform litigation 
"[tlhe subject matter of the lawsuit is often not a dispute be- 
tween private individuals about private rights, but a grievance 
about the operation of public policy."1° 
The authors use Professor Chayes' model of the new public 
. law litigation as a framework within which to examine four con- 
troversies in the judicial activism debate. They divide the issues 
into two basic categories: 1) legitimacy - whether judicial in- 
volvement in policymaking is in keeping with the courts' proper 
role within the American separation of powers system; and 2) 
capacity - whether the judiciary can handle capably the new 
responsibilities it has assumed." Critics of judicial activism 
claim that the courts have far exceeded their role under the sep- 
aration of powers as envisioned by the framers of the Constitu- 
tion.lS Defenders of judicial activism have responded that this 
activism is not antidemocratic but provides an important ele- 
ment of popular sovereignty, and that the Constitution is a body 
of "fundamental law" established for the specific purpose of in- 
suring that basic individual rights and liberties would not be 
compromised by the tyranny of the majority operating through 
the legislature.ls The political debate, say the authors,'' has 
9. Chayea, The Role of the Judge in Atblic Law Litigation, 89 WV. L. REV. 1281, 
1282 (1976). 
10. Id. at 1302. 
11. REaELL & BLOCK. supra note 3, at 4. 
12. See, e.g., R. BERDER, GOVERN- BY JUDICIARY 249-50 (1977). 
13. See Johnson, The Constitution and the Federal District Judge, 54 TEX. L. REV. 
903,914-16 (1976); Lavi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 
374-78 (1976). 
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been paralleled in the more rarified area of legal scholarship by a 
discussion articulated in terms of "principlelpolicy" issues: 
whether courts should be limited to deciding cases on the basis 
of strict legal principles or should be free to engage in broader 
policy deliberations. Those favoring the "principle" approach 
prefer a more limited traditional role within the separation of 
powers scheme.'" Supporters of the broader policy approach ac- 
cept and encourage more judicial activism within the policymak- 
ing arena normally the domain of the other branches of 
government. 
On still another plateau, the principlelpolicy distinction can 
be viewed as a jurisprudential debate between the instrumental- 
ism of legal realism - its openness to a judicial role in poli- 
cymaking, and receptivity to the use of social science evidence 
by the courts - and the "principled" approach of Professor 
Wechsler, later adapted by Professor Dworkin.l6 Both Wechsler 
and Dworkin insist that judicial decisions be based on "neutral 
principles" of law, but Dworkin argues that the sources of "prin- 
ciples" are broader." These sources are sufficiently rich to pro- 
vide a single right answer to every hard case. Dworkin believes 
that judges should not decide policy issues but should base their 
rulings on principles even if such rulings have substantial social 
or political implications. He claims his approach fits much of 
contemporary judicial activism into a "principled" mold.18 The 
authors agree with Dworkin that while the line between princi- 
ple and policy is difficult to establish, the division can be made. 
Further, the way judges perceive their role and formally justify 
their decisions and the manner in which the parties present 
14. REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 7. 
15. In Nixonian days, this group was known by the label "strict constructionists." 
16. REBBU & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 8-9. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Princi- 
ples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. FW. 1 (1959); Yudof, School Desegregation: 
Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme 
Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1978). Profeasor Dworkin insists that judicial de- 
cisions be based upon neutral principles of law. But, he takes a different view of what ie 
encompassed by law. Legal righta therefore may be based on a discrete set of precedents 
and statutes and also on justifying principles devised from institutional structures, 
morals, and political theories integrating the two. REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
See Dworkin, Hard Coses, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975). 
17.  ELL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 8-9. 
18. See Dworkin, Seven Critics, 11 GA. L. REV. 1201, 1237 (1977). 
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their claims, although not providing incontrovertible distinctions 
between principle and policy, constitute important behavioral 
data.'@ Thus, in their analysis of education cases the authors at- 
tempt to determine the degree to which parties justified their 
claims and defenses and the courts explained their decisions - 
on the basis of principle or policy.*O Rebel1 and Block focus upon 
two questions in analyzing the judiciary's factfinding capabili- 
ties: 1) to what extent were the courts able to obtain the neces- 
sary information; and 2) how effectively did the judges deal with 
and comprehend the social science data presented to them? 
Related to the legitimacy debate is the question whether the 
parties in the new public law litigation are sufficiently represen- 
tative of the interests affected by a court ~ rder .~ '  In the tradi- 
tional separation of powers view, the legislature is the primary 
repository for the articulation of public policy issues because it 
theoretically represents all parties. To the extent that courts en- 
gage in public policy issues their legitimacy is affected, particu- 
larly if the litigants speak only for themselves and large numbers 
affected are unrepresented in the litigation.** 
To test whether all those having a substantial interest in the 
cases studied were represented in the court proceedings, Rebell 
and Block attempt to answer the question empirically by deter- 
mining: 1) were most social policy lawsuits in federal courts filed 
by minority plaintiffs; 2) to what extent were class action proce- 
dures used to argue the depth of representation; 3) to what ex- 
tent did the party structure follow the broad breadth of repre- 
sentation implied in Chayes' theory; and 4) were there any 
indications that in a significant number of cases litigated by the 
public interest advocacy, lawyers remained unresponsive to their 
19. REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 33. 
20. Principle is defined as "[a] statement establishing a right of an individual 
against the state or against another individual (or, less frequently, the right of an institu- 
tion to maintain the integrity of ita legally defined prerogatives)." RBBELL & BLOCK, 
supra note 3, at 23. 
A policy is "[a] statement concerning collective goals. Policy arguments consider the 
relative importance or desirability of particular social goals, andlor the relative efficiency 
and desirability of particular methods for achieving such goals." Id. at 24. 
21. Id. at 9. See D. H o ~ o w m ,  THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 49-50 (1977); Bell, 
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideab and Client Interests in School Desegregation 
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 491 (1976). 
22. RESELL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 9. 
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clients' interests? 
In addition to the legitimacy of court activism, the debate 
on the judiciary's proper role has focused upon "the comparative 
ability of the courts to deal effectively and efficiently with social 
problems that traditionally were handled exclusively by the leg- 
islative and administrative bran~hes."~~ Is the factfinding pro- 
cess of litigation suited for the complex data gathering needed to 
"discover the truth"? Critics of judicial activism have argued 
that even if courts were able to obtain sufficient social science 
data, they would be untrained to fully understand and assimi- 
late it. 
The most striking aspect of the new public law litigation 
model is the remedial decree which provides for a complex ongo- 
ing regime of performance involving the court in detailed super- 
vision of the implementation of new policies and practices. Thie 
surveillance is often protracted as a result of resistance to the 
implementation of the decree.%' 
The remedial decree is at the core of the new public law 
litigation. It is at this remedy stage that the breadth of those 
affected first may be dis~erned.'~ The issue of judicial intrusive- 
ness into the legislative and executive domain becomes central 
at this plateau. Broad remedial decrees have been criticized be- 
cause they involve courts in administrative or legislative respon- 
sibilities for which they are ill-suited. The authors measure the 
extent of judicial intrusion into the local policymaking process 
by classifying all of the cases where the plaintiffs prevailed into 
categories of reform decree and self-executing judgments.'@ They 
also study party participation in the formulation of the decree, 
the use of monitoring mechanisms, and the effectiveness of court 
inter~ention.~~ 
23. Id. at 11 (emphasis omitted). 
24. Chayea, supra note 9, at 1298-1302. See also Special Project, The Remedial Pro- 
cess in Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784, 813-42 (1978). 
25. ReeeL~ & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 58. 
26. Id. at 59. 
27. Id. at 61. 
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111. Methodology 
Rebel1 and Block have undertaken a prodigious amount of 
research. They have systematically examined sixty-five federal 
trial court proceedings decided between 1970 and 1977 which at- 
tempted to change system-wide practices, policies, or rules in 
the public schools.a8 They have interviewed 130 attorneys for the 
principal parties in sixty of the sixty-five cases. Finally they 
have organized their research to empirically test the four issues 
in the judicial activism debate: first, did courts decide issues in 
terms of legal principles thus acting within the proper sphere of 
judicial decisionmaking or did they reach decisions on the basis 
of policymaking thereby, as their critics would say, intruding 
into the responsibilities of other branches of government; sec- 
ond, were those with a substantial interest in the controversy 
represented in court proceedings; third, did the judiciary have 
the capability to engage in comprehensive factfinding and analy- 
sis; and finally, did courts have the ability to devise and imple- 
ment appropriate remedies?aB Excluded from their sample are 
non-public school cases and all of the school desegregation cases 
decided during the time frame selected. The authors believe that 
the excluded categories have been subject to substantial doctri- 
nal and empirical analysis and want to cover the largest number 
of cases without necessarily duplicating work done by others.a0 
The omission of desegregation cases, containing issues which 
have so inflamed the public if not the commentators over the 
role of the court, is unfortunate, for it diminishes the authors' 
conclusions. 
The sample includes the full universe of published decisions 
during the time frame selected, rather than a stratified sample 
including cases selected randomly from categories within the to- 
tal universe. Fifty-one percent of the cases involved regulation of 
student speech and cond~ct.~ '  These cases are not only dated, 
they may be more typical of classical bipolar litigation. Further- 
28. Id. at 63. 
29. Id. at 65. 
30. Id. at 221. 
31. The authors correctly suggest that the grooming cases, all of which occurred 
from 1970 to 1973, were proxy wars reflecting views on the Vietnam conflict and on the 
counterculture. Id. at 27. 
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more, several unanswered questions rise to the surface: has edu- 
cational policymaking changed over time as courts have become 
more accustomed to such cases; do the authors find that there is 
any statistically significant difference in earlier cases from the 
later ones in their sample; are the results statistically significant 
in terms of relevance to the judicial activism debate? The au- 
thors admit that the degree of confidence of their inferences 
could be questioned, but they claim that if they applied a formal 
statistical test, there would be a confidence level of ninety-five 
percent.sa This test could not be done because of the nature of 
the sample. The authors state that the primary reason the 
reader should believe the validity of their conclusions is that 
they are based on well informed judgments. This is not an alto- 
gether satisfactory answer. 
IV. The Case and Legislative Studies 
To illustrate in greater detail the quantitatively based find- 
ings and to expand upon them with more qualitative analysis, 
Rebel1 and Block undertake comprehensive studies of two com- 
plex federal cases, Chance v. Board of Examinersss and Otero u. 
Mesa County Valley School District No. 51." Heeding the 
warning of Professor Donald Horowitz to be "chary of drawing 
inferences about the courts without an institutionally compara- 
tive frame of referen~e,"~~ the authors also undertake two de- 
tailed studies of the New York and Colorado legislative ap- 
proaches to educational policy problems similar to those in the 
32. Id. at 226. The confidence level is the certainty that the conclusion or result is 
not due to the randomness or normal occurrence. The confidence level of 95% ie used to 
prove or disprove hypotheses. The authors stak. 
This estimation rule [the 95% confidence level] cannot be applied to observations 
of our sample without important qualifications - namely, that the sample we are 
studying was not drawn strictly at random, and that the population from which 
the sample was drawn did not consist of homogeneous, independent unite (since 
earlier court decisions affect later court decisions). 
Id. at 308 n.21. See 2 K. YEOMANS, TATISTICS FOR THE SOCUL SCIENTIST 38-43 (1970). 
33. 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd, 496 
F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), reu'd, 561 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
34. 408 F. Supp. 162 (D. Colo. 1975), reh'g denied, 568 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1978). 
on remand, 470 F. Supp. 326 (D. Colo.l979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir. 1980). 
35. REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at  73 (quoting D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND 
SOCIAL POLICY 18 (1977)). 
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judicial case studies. These federal cases and legislative ap- 
proaches provide a fascinating comparative analysis as to how 
different institutions approach common issues. 
Chance v. Board of Examiners was brought on behalf of a 
class of black and Puerto Rican educators who alleged that the 
traditional examination system used to license principals and 
other supervisors in the New York City public school system was 
racially discriminatory. After issuance of a preliminary injunc- 
tion in 1971, and a final judgment based on a consent decree of 
two of the parties in 1972, the compliance stage of the litigation 
continued for another six years! It  involved the court in such 
issues as validation of standardized tests, definition of qualifica- 
tions for educational leadership, parental involvement in the hir- 
ing and evaluation process, and affirmative action requirements 
for staff layoffs. Although the second circuit ordered the district 
court to terminate its jurisdiction, at least one court litigations6 
and another federal case based on related issues persist today.s7 
Otero v. Mesa County Valley involved a class action com- 
plaint on behalf of Mexican-American parents and school age 
children residing in a Colorado rural town. The suit alleged that 
the school district's educational program and hiring practices 
discriminated against Chicanos. Plaintiffs requested that the 
court institute a comprehensive bilingual/bicultural curriculum 
and require affirmative action hiring programs. 
The New York legislative study involved a teacher senior- 
ity-layoff bill considered in 1976 which addressed several issues 
relating to teacher demands as opposed to concerns of supervi- 
sory professionals raised in the Chance litigation. The Colorado 
study centered on that state's legislature's deliberations in 1975 
over a bilingual/bicultural educational program, an ideal coun- 
terpoint to the issues presented in Otero. In New York the 
Chance court granted plaintiffs claim, but the legislature did 
not pass the seniority-layoff bill. In Colorado, after an acrimoni- 
ous trial, the Otero court entered judgment for the defendants 
on all counts, however, the Colorado legislature passed a broad 
bilinguaVbicultural program. Chance differed from Otero not 
36. See Elsberg v. Board of Educ., 99 Misc. 2d 1101, 418 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup. Ct. 
Kings County 1979). 
37. See Macchiarola v. Board of Examiners, No. 81 Civ. 4798 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
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only in the judgment. In the former, negotiations between the 
parties were harmonious; discovery remarkably efficient. In 
Otero relationships were acrimonious and factfinding disputed 
throughout the trial. The thrust of Chance was in its protracted 
remedial phase; in Otero the important focus was on liability 
factfinding. 
Otero was an example of how not to bring complex and con- 
troversial educational litigation. Even the plaintiffs attorney ad- 
mitted the case should not have been brought in the district of 
Grand Junction which was conservative and not accustomed to 
dealing with this type of racial issue.88 If there was any positive 
aspect to this lawsuit, it was the cultural and political awakening 
of the Chicano community and the realization by Anglo educa- 
tors that they had to take into account the cultural aspirations 
of Hispanic students. Whether this is the proper function of a 
court, however, is not addressed in this study. 
One of the most significant aspects of this book is the find- 
ing which disputes the common assumption concerning the su- 
periority of legislative as opposed to judicial factfinding capabili- 
ties. Both legislatures - New. York, where each legislator has 
some research capacity, and Colorado, where research capability 
is allied to the committee structure - reveal a lack of capacity 
for systematic or analytical fact analysis. Legislative hearings 
constituted a showcase function: the facts accumulated were not 
scrutinized by the legislators and did not appear to have had 
major impact on the final outcome.8s 
Moreover, in the legislative area there is no mechanism for 
compelling efficient discovery. A court can compensate for lack 
of staff by requiring the parties to submit necessary evidence. In 
the legislative process there are neither the resources nor the in- 
terest in such information. The legislature by nature of its politi- 
cal approach is more inclined toward avoiding basic social fact 
issues and data assessment. 
In terms of the capacity to consider broad comprehensive 
implications of major reforms, courts and legislatures are subject 
to similar strengths and weaknesses. In both fora the interested 
parties work out the details of the remedy. The authors conclude 
38. REBELL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 282 n.11. 
39. Id. at 194. 
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that there appears to be no basis for arguing that the courts are 
less capable of comprehensively structuring complex systematic 
reforms than the legi~lature.'~ That may seem less of an issue, 
however, than whether the courts should shape these compre- 
hensive reforms. 
V. Major Conclusions 
In sixty-four of the sixty-five cases the complaints contained 
at least one claim grounded in the form of "principle". Nearly 
all of plaintiffs' attorneys framed their complaints in a form of 
an allegation based upon constitutional rights, so necessary to 
standing in federal district court. The obviousness of this ap- 
proach recalls Derek Bok's aside: "All research corrupts but em- 
pirical research corrupts ab~olutely."~~ However predictable this 
conclusion may seem, a function of empirical research is to look 
for laws or connections among facts in order to explain and to 
predict. Only by building up such basic generalizations can we 
obtain more valid  conclusion^.^^ 
Professor Dworkin has been criticized for the intricate dis- 
tinctions he has drawn between principles and policies, because 
they are so ephemeral that they serve simply as a shield protect- 
ing-activist judges from charges of usurpation.'$ The authors 
find that they can not categorize all of their cases as "policy" or 
"principle" because their primary principle can be applied in in- 
dividual disputes without substantive consideration of certain 
limited policy arguments." Consequently, the authors develop a 
third category of qualified principle; for instance, in student 
grooming cases when the plaintiff would argue principle, judges 
would have to consider the validity of the defendant administra- 
tor's claims that ruling for the plaintiff would lead to disruption 
40. Id. at 210. 
41. D. BOK, THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1981-82, at 6 (Report to Overseers of Harv. U. 
1983). 
42. See READINGS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 6-11 (M. Bradbeck ed. 
1968). 
43. Creenawalt, Policy, Rights, and Judicial Decision, 11 GA. L. Rev. 991, 1036 
(1977). 
44. R&BBLL & BLOCK, supra note 3, at 24. 
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of the educational program. Eighty percent of all of the cases 
fall into this intertwined principlelpolicy category. The authors 
find this result "striking and unexpe~ted"'~ and admit that crit- 
ics and proponents of judicial activism have viable arguments. 
The authors further split hairs by concluding that what is signif- 
icant in such cases is not whether policy arguments are ever in- 
volved in court decisions, but whether the crux of the case in- 
volves a matter of principle that properly belonged before the 
courts.4e Interestingly, when the courts, as opposed to the re- 
searchers characterized the case as based upon policy grounds, 
the defendant school board won each time. 
B. Interest Representation Issues 
The study confirms the prevalent assumption that most ed- 
ucational policy litigations are brought by minorities." One rea- 
son for this may be that the courts provide better access to mi- 
nority aspirations than the legislature, which often treats 
minorities as just one more interest group. 
A criticism of institutional reform litigation is that the 
plaintiffs speak only for themselves, yet a broader group having 
a direct stake in the outcome of the lawsuit is unrepresented. 
Rebel1 and Block assume that depth of representativeness can 
be ascertained by determining whether cases were filed as class 
actions. The authors state that class action status is significant 
since it can serve as a barometer of plaintiffs' intentions to 
speak for a broader group of individuals interested in policy re- 
form.J8 Other reasons, however, come to mind. Attorneys' fees 
and general litigation strategy may promote the class action 
technique in institutional reform litigation since the defendants 
will have a greater incentive to settle before trial. 
A significant finding in the survey is that judges tend either 
45. Id. at 25. 
46. Id. at 201. 
47. Fifty-six percent of the cases sampled were brought by suspect and "semi-sus- 
pect" classes. Minority plaintiffs were successful in 71% of the cases. 
Semi-suspect classes include disadvantaged groups treated more recently by statutes 
and court decisions as disadvantaged minorities in need of special protection, even 
though the Supreme Court has not explicitly identified them as suspect classes. The au- 
thors include in this category: females, handicapped, poor, and elderly. Id. at 36. 
48. Id. at 37. 
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to delay the classification of the litigation as a class action or 
ignore such claims. The corollary of this finding is the judiciary's 
failure to provide the protective mechanisms of Rule 23'" which 
hold plaintiffs' attorneys responsible for explaining what groups 
they represent and how they propose to represent broader inter- 
ests. The authors believe that although class certification proce- 
dures potentially can provide a substantial assurance of repre- 
sentativeness, they presently are not being utilized to effectuate 
this goal. Possibly, the critics are correct in interpreting the lack 
of class actions to mean that not all of the interests affected by 
the litigation are involved in it. Courts readily granted requests 
for intervention either as a party or as amicus. In contradiction 
to the assumptions of Professor Chayes' multipolar model, addi- 
tional parties tended to support with variations the arguments 
of the main participants rather than to set out distinct indepen- 
dent perspectives. 
Thus, courts appear to be open to broad involvement of all 
interested parties, but not all potentially affected groups seek to 
participate, and even those groups who do participate do not 
present a broad spectrum of strongly diverse views to the courts. 
The authors conclude that it may be that the real issues in edu- 
cational litigations are essentially bipolar and that all interests 
are generally being adequately represented. One might conclude, 
however, that the inherent bipolar orientation of the adversarial 
judicial process discourages a broader multipolar approach.50 It 
may be that certain kinds of cases - grooming and speech - 
are bipolar. Certainly, if desegregation cases had been included, 
the multipolarity of the sample would have increased. Another 
reason for bipolarity of representation is that the issues involved 
are essentially bipolar but the remedial phase is multipolar. This 
may also explain why judges made decisions on class action alle- 
gations after trial."' Perhaps it is only after the factfinding is 
developed and a decision reached that parties are even aware 
that they may be affected by the court's decision. 
Fifty-seven percent of the sample cases were brought by 
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
50. REBELL & BLOCK. supra note 3, at 41. 
51. Id. at 37. 
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public interest  attorney^.^' These lawyers brought the more 
complex cases involving a greater degree of substantive reform 
and were more likely to raise novel or relatively novel legal is- 
s u e ~ . ~ ~  Public interest attorneys generally pick and choose their 
cases. The more intricate educational cases with highly novel le- 
gal theories are of great interest because of their potentially im- 
portant ramifications. Because these cases are so highly cost 
inefficient and plaintiffs tend to be minorities and poor, only a 
specialized public interest attorney 'could possibly afford to 
mount such litigation. Furthermore, only public interest attor- 
neys may have the technical and financial resources to litigate 
an extensive reform case."' Rebel1 and Block tentatively con- 
clude that public interest attorneys do speak for their clients 
rather than promote their own ideological views.66 They say that 
the real debate is whether it is desirable for society to provide 
minority group interests with legal resources to bring major re- 
form cases.66 That may be overdrawing the issue. 
C .  Factfinding Capability Issues 
The study concludes that the adversary process is an effec- 
tive information gathering technique in social policy  litigation^.^' 
Where the school board was the defendant, discovery was com- 
plete and efficient. Perhaps these defendants were more inclined 
to accede to requests for information because of their inherent 
public exposure, and the natural public interest in the 
Although every case in the sample challenged the system- 
wide application of an educational policy, in relatively few was 
the resolution of conflicting social fact evidence central to the 
court's de~ision.~" De-emphasizing social factfinding does not, 
52. Id. at 43. 
53. Id. at 41-42. 
54. The authors found t h i  in Chance. Id. at 114. 
55. Id.  at 204. 
56. Id. at 205. 
57. Id. at 46, 115, 205. 
58. Id. at 206. 
59. Judges often utilized various avoidance devices which allowed for disposal of 
plaintiffs claims on the merits without a close scrutiny of the parties' competing social 
fact arguments. Id .  at 50. 
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admit the authors, address the question whether judges have the 
capacity to comprehend and decide these issues.60 Quantitative 
assessments are resistant to such survey techniques. It should be 
pointed out that in school desegregation cases, which were not 
included in the study, the use of data may be different. Compli- 
cated factfinding is often based upon analysis of asserted causal 
hypotheses or controversial data. 
Critics of the use of complex social science evidence in edu- 
cational cases may have underestimated the judiciary's ability to 
comprehend this data. At least in this study, judges who did 
deal with social fact evidence had little difficulty in obtaining a 
working familiarity with these concepts and used them to assess 
the credibility of key witnesses. The authors conclude that bbth 
the strength and weakness of the courts as a factfinding mecha- 
nism depend on the adversary system which is its motivating 
force.61 If the opposing parties present a complete record, the 
court is equipped to deal with it. If one of the parties fails to 
present countervailing arguments or information, a court lacking 
an independent specialized knowledge of the area will base its 
decision on the facts and arguments before it. Whatever criti- 
cisms there are of the ability of the judiciary to engage in 
factfinding, Rebell and Block find that courts are much better 
equipped than legislatures to evaluate social fact evidence sys- 
tematically and to render analytically reasoned  decision^.^^ 
D. Remedial Capability 
The data rebuts the criticism that the judiciary lacks the 
resources, expertise, or perspective needed to implement educa- 
tional reform successfully. Reform decrees were not used in most 
of the cases in which the plaintiffs prevailed because judges, 
consistent with traditional canons of judicial caution, attempted 
to approve the least expansive vindication of plaintiffs' rights.B3 
The degree of compliance by the parties also may impact upon 
the scope of the remedy. In many institutional reform cases, re- 
calcitrant defendants oblige the judge to order a wide ranging 
60. Id. at 54. 
61. Id. at 207. 
62. Id. at 209. 
63. Id. at 59. 
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"reform" decree. In the sample presented, the degree of compli- 
ance was higher than one might have expected. The question is 
posed whether this affected the type of decree issued. 
A study of the factual situation in desegregation cases could 
undermine the results of the study. In desegregation cases wide- 
spread noncompliance by publicly elected school board officials 
and by parents was common. The judge alone remained to im- 
plement the decree. Unlike the desegregation cases, with one ex- 
ception, the courts in the sample did not become fully involved 
in the day-to-day administrative policy ramifications of their 
orders. 
VI. Conclusion 
Did the research settle the major issues in the judicial activ- 
ism debate? Rebel1 and Block found that the courts do not act 
in strict accordance with certain assumptions of the classical 
separation of powers theory. In public law litigation they operate 
in a more political manner than the role contemplated under the 
traditional model of court adjudication. Courts have conducted 
themselves more than competently in this difficult new area 
The defects in judicial performance are not caused by the inept- 
ness of the judiciary compared to other governmental agencies 
but by the social, political, and technical characteristics of the 
particular controversies."' The authors point to an increased ac- 
tivism in all branches of government and suggest the need to 
reformulate the basic issues in the judicial activism controversy. 
They also suggest future empirical research to consider the long- 
term consequences to the courts in terms of the legitimacy of 
plunging into social controver~y.~~ 
This reviewer came away from Educational Policy Making 
and the Courts, and specifically from the detailed case studies, 
with the belief that the variables attached to a lawsuit are so 
random and diffuse that to draw generalities from any sample 
requires much more sophisticated statistical analysis than that 
which is presented in this empirical study. The authors honestly 
share with the reader their own ambiguities on this issue?" Yet, 
64. Id. at 214-15. 
65. Id. at 216. 
66. Id. at 199. 
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if quantitative conclusions are at  too low a level of generaliza- 
tion, the danger is that they become insignificant. For example, 
if all reviewers of this book reduced their answers to a simple 
yes or no in response to the question: "Did you like this book," 
we could tabulate a generalization about the book. But how use- 
ful or significant would it be? This is not to minimize Rebel1 and 
Block's achievement. They are among the first to attempt to link 
a coherent theory of the legal process to empirically grounded 
research. Hopefully, this important book will encourage the au- 
thors and others to continue such research. 
A final word of praise is owed to the University of Chicago 
Press. In an age when editing and publishing practices are to 
traditional standards as organ music at  the ball park is to Han- 
del, it should be noted that this is a graphically well designed 
and edited book. 
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